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Abstract
Uncertainty about long-term climate policy is a major driving force in the evolution of the
carbon market price. Since this price enters the investment decision process of regulated
firms, this uncertainty increases the cost of capital for investors and might deter investments into new technologies at the company level. We apply a real options-based approach to assess the impact of climate change policy in the form of a constant or growing
price floor on investment decisions of a single firm in a competitive environment. This firm
has the opportunity to switch from a high-carbon “dirty” technology to a low-carbon “clean”
technology. Using Monte Carlo simulation and dynamic programming techniques for real
market data, we determine the optimal CO2 price floor level and growth rate in order to
induce investments into the low-carbon technology. We show these findings to be robust
to a large variety of input parameter settings.
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1. Introduction
In the context of reducing long-term carbon price uncertainty stemming from ambiguous
climate change policy, some contributions in the academic literature have suggested several forms of regulatory price management, mainly in the form of a price cap or safety
valve1 (Pizer (2002); Jacoby and Ellerman (2004); Szolgayová, Fuss, and Obersteiner
(2008)).2 If realized abatement costs turn out to be higher than expected (i.e. the emission
cap is too low) the price cap serves as a ceiling on the carbon price and emitters can buy
additional permits at the specified price3. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002), Helm (2008),
Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn (2010), Fell and Morgenstern (2009), and Philibert extend this
discussion by analyzing a “symmetric safety valve”, also referred to as a price collar. This
approach not only insures emitters against higher than expected costs, but also sets a
minimum carbon price, thereby bounding compliance costs downward. Experience from
the EU ETS, the world’s largest multi-national carbon trading scheme, provides evidence
for the thought that an overestimation of abatement costs might be a more realistic scenario than an underestimation. Therefore, a price floor might be a more critical design element
within a fixed price range than a cap.
A price floor reduces uncertainty over future profitability by guaranteeing a minimum rate
of return to an investor or firm pondering an investment decision. This argument is particularly important in the energy sector, which is characterized by capital-intensive low-carbon
technologies and long-lived power plants. In this sense a minimum carbon price creates
incentives to invest in new technologies over and above those already induced by the
(unmanaged) market price. Abatement will still take place if the costs of CO2-reductions
are lower than the price of allowances, since profit-maximizing firms will implement the
emissions reductions and sell the surplus allowances. A second argument in favor of the
implementation of a price floor is the possibility that it would limit the volatility of carbon
market prices (Grüll and Taschini (2011)). In times of growing volatility in fuel prices this
fact would favor renewable energy.

1

The idea of combining price (tax) and quantity (allowances) instruments, usually referred to as a hybrid
system, was initially suggested by (Roberts and Spence (1976)).
2
Alternative ways to reduce climate policy uncertainties are mentioned in (Lambie (2010)).
3
(Murray, Newell, and Pizer (2008)) extend the concept of a price ceiling with an unlimited volume of extra
permits by the idea of an allowance reserve that caps this volume.
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An intensive academic discussion about such a downside insurance in carbon markets
started only recently with the work of Wood and Jotzo (2011). This is surprising given that
the concept of a price floor has already found its way into legislation in the United Kingdom
and Australia (HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs (2010); Australian Government
(2011)). In the case of the UK the floor is one of several measures for encouraging lowcarbon energy investments (Department of Energy & Climate Change (2011)). Commencing on 1 April 2013 at around 15.70 GBP/ton CO2, following a straight line to 30 GBP/ton in
2020 and targeting 70 GBP/ton in 2030, the UK price floor is designed to top up the carbon
price of the EU ETS – which the UK is a member of – to a national target level. Since other
countries under the EU ETS do not have a similar price floor, this measure will increase
abatement costs in the UK relative to other EU countries. UK legislators justify this higher
burden by arguing that regulatory uncertainty about future carbon prices may undermine
long-term price signals and incentives and that the carbon price from the EU ETS might
not be strong and stable enough to stimulate sufficient investments in low-carbon technologies.4 The Commission implicitly agrees to this diagnosis when stating that, in order to
boost low-carbon technologies, “[…] appropriate measures need to be considered, including revisiting the agreed linear reduction of the ETS cap” (European Commission (2011)).
In this sense an additional goal evolves from a cap-and-trade system: it could be used to
promote technological innovation to a greater extent than automatically induced by the
long-term price signals from the market.
Taking this logic as our starting point, we contribute to this debate about price management in the form of a floor price in the carbon market. Setting aside organizational questions concerning the implementation of the floor (for these we refer to Wood and Jotzo
(2011)) we focus on how investment decisions in the electric power sector are affected by
the introduction of a permit price floor. We employ a real options model of an individual
electricity producer who currently operates a “dirty” power generation technology, which
we define as a technology that has considerably higher CO2 emissions per production unit
than alternative technologies. This implies that the firm has comparatively large compliance costs. The company furthermore faces an investment decision which would permit it
to switch to a “clean” generation technology, i.e. a technology with low emissions per production unit. By simulating sets of cashflow paths as functions of technology specific cost
4

(Grubb and Neuhoff (2006)) argue that uncertainty concerning expected permit prices is a major reason for
firms to delay investment under the EU ETS.
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related to construction, fuel and carbon emissions, we show that a regulatory intervention
in the form of a price management mechanism in the CO 2-market influences the optimal
timing of the investment decision of this company. In particular, we demonstrate that the
introduction of a price floor can lead to an earlier adoption of low-carbon technologies. In
this case, the CO2-market acts as an instrument for technology policy.
The methodology we apply is similar to that in several contributions dealing with investment decisions in the power sector under different dimensions of uncertainties. Comparable studies, among others, are Laurikka and Koljonen (2006), Fuss et al. (2008), Szolgayová, Fuss, and Obersteiner (2008), Yang et al. (2008), Fuss et al. (2009), Fuss and Szolgayová (2010), Chen and Tseng (2011), Kettunen, Bunn, and Blyth (2011) and Zhu and
Fan (2011). However, none of the aforementioned contributions evaluate the influence of a
carbon price floor on the investment decision in general and the timing of the technology
switch specifically. The only study employing, at least in passing, a price floor in a quantitative model is Abadie, Chamorro, and González-Eguino (2011). In contrast to their work,
we do not only perform a detailed analysis of a constant floor price level but investigate
different designs of the floor. In particular, we perform an in-depth investigation of a price
floor mechanism with linearly increasing minimum prices. In addition, we endogenously
compute the floor price necessary to trigger abandonment of the “dirty” technology at an
earlier time. Finally, we perform a number of robustness checks using a large variety of
different input parameter settings. These tests qualitatively substantiate our main finding of
the existence of a trigger minimum price design.
In what follows, chapter 2 presents the model we use to analyze the influence of a price
floor on a firm’s optimal investment decision. Chapter 3 contains results from Monte Carlo
simulations and backward dynamic programming as well as robustness checks. Chapter 4
concludes.

2. The model
We model a single power generating firm which is a price taker in all markets and supplies
electricity inelastically. The firm has to comply with an emissions trading system by obtaining emissions permits covering its production needs. We assume it to buy and redeem the
necessary carbon certificates at the end of each period. This ensures that the company
never holds any surplus certificates which it would wish to sell back to the market.

4
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2.1. Structure of the decision problem
The firm currently operates a “dirty” technology ( ) power plant with a remaining life of

.

This technology is characterized by high emissions per production unit, causing the firm to
face high costs of compliance with the emissions trading system.5 The company has to
make a decision about replacing the currently operating power plant before the end of its
economic life. In particular, the firm can choose one of three courses of action at the beginning of each period, modeled in discrete time: (i) discontinuing business, (ii) replacing
the existing power plant with a new power plant using the same technology

, or (iii) re-

placing the existing power plant with a new power plant using a “clean” technology ( ),
which is characterized by low emissions per production unit.6
If the firm chooses option (i), we assume that the disinvestment is associated with costs
(disassembly of the power plant, termination of contracts, etc.) and revenues (sale of the
old power plant and/or the land it is built on) which sum to zero, with cash flows of zero in
every period thereafter.7 If it chooses options (ii) or (iii), it faces a technology dependent
investment cost of

, where

the construction time of

{

}. The investment cost is distributed uniformly over

. During the construction time, the current plant is assumed to

continue operating, yielding cash flows of

every period. After construction is finished,

the old power plant is closed down with net revenues and costs of zero and the new power
plant starts yielding cash flows of

for every period of its life of

.8 Note that, while de-

cisions are always made at the beginning of a period, cash flows are assumed to accrue at
its end.
Except for the case where the firm decides to (irreversibly) discontinue business, we require it to have exactly one power plant under operation at all times, i.e. there may be no
gap between the end of the life of the current power plant and the end of the construction
time of a new power plant, and the old and a new power plant may not be operated simul-

5

The exact parameters for our numerical analysis will be provided in section 3.
(Fuss and Szolgayová (2010)) conduct a similar analysis investigating the decision to switch from a coalfired power plant to a wind farm. However, they focus on the role of uncertainty associated with the technological progress of green technologies and do not account for a carbon price floor.
7
Note that we regard the replacement decision for this one power plant in isolation and disregard any effects
it might have on other activities of the firm.
8
We model the dirty technology as being static, meaning that a new dirty power plant’s cash flows follow
the same stochastic process as the current dirty power plant’s.
6

5
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taneously. Since the object of our analysis is the replacement decision for the currently
operating plant, we can thus set
[ ]
and refer to [

(1)

] as the investment decision horizon. This is the time interval over which

the firm has the opportunity to freely choose between all three options. If it waited longer
than , it could no longer choose freely between technologies

and

if it wanted to meet

the requirement to have a plant under operation at all times. We require the company’s
decision to be irreversible for the model horizon. In other words, if the company decides to
build a new plant of technology , it will then operate this plant (and this technology) until
[ ]. If the firm decides to discontinue this

after the end of the model horizon
line of its business, it will never re-enter it.

Our question concerning the introduction of a price floor in the carbon market is threefold:
firstly, we are interested in whether the dirty plant is replaced or not. If this is the case, we
secondly investigate which technology is chosen. Thirdly, we want to determine at which
point in time

– if ever– the “dirty” plant is optimally replaced by the “clean” one.

2.2. Stochastic price processes
We assume the CO2 price to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) as in Szolgayová, Fuss, and Obersteiner (2008) und Yang et al. (2008).9 The CO2 price

is therefore

modeled as having two components – an expected drift and a random walk:
(2)

9

Note that we choose GBM processes for the ease of modeling and because the specific form of stochastic
process is not the focus of our analysis. It is however quite possible to introduce other stochastic processes
into the model. As will become clear later on, the use of processes generating non-normally distributed outcomes requires adjusted techniques for assessing the timing of the investment decision. Specifically, we
currently use ordinary least squares regression to estimate expected values. This simple and robust approach would have to be modified by employing more advanced regression techniques. With regard to the
type of process specifications to use, we consider models including regime switches and jumps in the price
paths to be particularly promising candidates for future work. They have attained increased relevance in light
of the recent discussion about the use of nuclear power and alternative technologies, as well as the large
impact of environmental policy decisions, both of which carry the potential to instantly and strongly affect the
circumstances on carbon markets.
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where

is the drift rate,

denotes the standard deviation, and

is a standard Wiener

process. We use the same underlying process, albeit with different parameters, to model
the price our firm receives for selling electricity,

, and to model its technology specific

variable costs (operating, maintenance and fuel costs),
cesses is discretized, departs from a fixed value at time
the entire model horizon

. Each realization of these pro, and is being simulated for

. We assume the individual processes to be uncorrelated in the

larger part of the subsequent analysis, but report results obtained with correlated processes in section 3.4.

2.3. Dynamic programming
Our derivation of the optimal decision in this context is loosely based on the approach of
Longstaff and Schwartz (2001), which brings together backward oriented dynamic programming techniques and forward oriented simulation techniques, and is thus a versatile
procedure which allows for handling multivariate state variables (see Gamba and Fusari
(2009)). The key insight of Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) was that the conditional value
(expectation) of future payments can be estimated from the cross-sectional information in
the simulation by using a least squares approach.10
Consider Figure 1 showing the time structure of the model. At the beginning of every period in the interval [

], the firm can choose to either continue producing using its current

power plant, to irreversibly switch to the technology

by building a new power plant, or to

discontinue business altogether.

10

The instrument modeled by (Longstaff and Schwartz (2001)), an American Call option, has the characteristics that (i) the underlying does not pay any dividends, and (ii) there are only two alternative courses of
action at each node - to exercise or not to exercise. In our example, the investments generate cash flows in
every period and we face the three-fold decision problem of continuing production with the current technology, investing in the new technology, or exiting the business altogether.

7
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Figure 1: Model time structure

Our optimization procedure starts with a Monte Carlo simulation, which is used to generate
paths for the relevant state variables. Based on these simulated paths, the dynamic programming algorithm compares the expected outcome of investing in a new technology
plant with delaying the investment for one more period, and with the possibility of exiting
the business immediately. Note that, in our solution algorithm, we do not allow for reinvestment in technology

at any time

. Given a positive discount rate, such a strategy

would always be suboptimal. A new plant of technology

generates the same cash flows

as the existing plant, yet requires payment of the investment cost. For this reason, if an
optimal solution entails reinvesting in technology

, this decision can only be made at

. We therefore do not consider premature reinvestment in

in our numerical

solution algorithm.
The optimal exercise decision at any point in time is obtained as the maximum of the immediate investment value, the expected value from delaying the decision, and zero in case
of disinvestment. Since the expected continuation value depends on future outcomes, the
procedure must work backwards from the latest (
time (

) to the earliest possible investment

) (Cortazar, Gravet, and Urzua (2008)). Following this procedure we obtain, for

each path, the optimal decision. This can be to discontinue business at any time
reinvest in technology
time

[

at time

[

], to

, or to invest in the clean technology at any

].

Operationally, the procedures of the dynamic programming approach differ between time
and any

. The following sections provide the algorithm we follow to solve the

dynamic programming problem.

8
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2.3.1. Determination of the decision at
We start by calculating the net present value of a plant investment at

for each simu-

lated path:
( )

( )

⏞

( )

⏞

∑

(

)

∑

⏞
(

)

∑

(

)
(3)

( )

⏞
(
where

)
[

(

)

] is the index of the specific simulated path under consideration, and (

denotes the discount factor applied at time
more, the cash flow

to cash flows occurring at time

electricity

. Further-

is defined as:
) (

(

where

)

)

is the revenue (calculated as the electricity output in MWh times the price for
) at time on the simulated path ,

are the variable costs (calculated as

the electricity output in MWh times the technology dependent variable cost factor) for each
of the two technologies,

are the carbon costs (calculated as the CO2 output in tons

times the price of carbon certificates
and

⁄

),

is the depreciation for the power plant,

is the corporate tax rate.

In order to maintain comparability, irrespective of the specific time at which the clean investment is realized, we consistently evaluate all investment programs over our model
horizon of

periods. Equation (3) rests on the simplifying assumption that the plant will be

sold for its remaining book value at the end of this time.11 The net present value from
equation (3) thus is the sum of four terms: (a) the cash flows from the (existing) technology
plant during the construction time of the new (

or ) plant; (b) the discounted (negative)

investment outlay for the new plant, distributed linearly over the construction time; (c) the
discounted sum of the cash flows from the plant over the time interval from the end of its
11

Note that in section 3 we choose to be sufficiently long that alternative treatments of the residual plant
value have a negligible impact on the optimal decision.

9
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construction until the end of the model horizon
selling the plant for its book value at

; and (d) the discounted revenue from

.

Because present values coming from simulated cash flow paths themselves are uncertain,
we need to form an expectation of these values. We achieve this by regressing the net
present values obtained under (3) on a linear combination of a set of basis functions of the
simulated state variables at time

, using a simple least-squares specification (Gamba

and Fusari (2009) and Longstaff and Schwartz (2001)):

(

where

)

(

is a constant, the

)

(

(4)

)

are regression coefficients,

on the simulated path , and

is the carbon price at time

is a white random error term.

We then use the regression parameters we obtain to calculate the estimated net present
value for each simulated path at time
[

|

]

̂
̂

:
̂

̂
(

̂
̂

)

(

(5)
̂

)

(

)

[ ] is the expectation operator, applied at time .

where

In the next step, we decide between exiting the business, reinvesting in technology

, and

investing in technology . We thus obtain the following expected net present value conditional on optimal investment behavior:
[

|

]
[

[

|

]

[

|

]]

(6)

10
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2.3.2. Determination of the decision at
The conditional expected net present value obtained in the previous section forms the basis for the analysis at

. Here we distinguish between the treatment of the case

where (i) we invest in the clean technology and (ii) we continue production using the dirty
technology.
In case (i), we again calculate each path’s net present value of investing in the clean technology using equation (3). We then use these to estimate the regression according to
equation (4) and calculate the vector of

expected net present values when investing in

the clean technology using equation (5).
For case (ii) we use the values obtained from equation (6) for
period

, add the cash flow for

, which accrues at the end of the period, and estimate the following re-

gression for

:

[

|

(

)

]

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

(

)

(7)

We then calculate the estimated net present value for each simulated path at time
using equation (5) with the coefficient estimates obtained from equation (7) to
obtain the expected net present values

[

|

]. Finally, we obtain the ex-

pected net present value conditional on optimal investment behavior at

by apply-

ing equation (6). The arguments of the maximum function in (6) now are the expected net
present values from cases (i) and (ii), and zero.
By repeating the steps undertaken for

for all other times

[

], we

derive the net present value conditional on optimal investment behavior for the entire investment decision horizon. The result along each simulation path is then the time of the
(temporally) first case where the decision is other than to continue operating the dirty technology plant. In other words, starting at time

and progressing forward through time,

we record for each path the earliest point in time where the optimal decision is to either
invest into technology

or to exit the business altogether.

11
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3. Numerical Results
This section presents results from example calculations using our methodology. While the
procedures can be applied to any decision regarding the timing of the switch to a lowemissions technology, for our numerical examples we compare a coal fired “dirty” plant to
a hydro powered “clean” plant. The following parameters characterizing the investment
decision are geared to real market data, with the revenues and costs associated with the
clean and dirty technologies being taken from findings of the European Commission’s
Strategic Energy Review (EC Energy Review 2008). Specifically, we assume that a power
company currently operates a technology

plant with an installed capacity of 1MW,

mio EUR (1265 EUR/kW), and
case of reinvestment in technology
. The technology

years. The construction time in the

is

years and the new plant has a life of

plant is characterized by

lowing equation (1) this implies that

years and

years. Fol-

and that the existing plant needs to be re-

placed at a yet to be determined optimal time
vestment in the currently operated technology

{

}. We also consider a rein-

which implies a lead time of 3 years.

However, since this decision is, if ever, taken only at

(3 years prior to the end of the

existing coal plant’s economic life) and thus lies outside our analysis’ time interval of interest, we do not explicitly report detailed results on that aspect.12
Assuming an average load capacity of 85%, a coal plant’s annual output is 1 MW ·
8760 h · 0.85 = 7446 MWh. Due to a lower annual load ratio of 50%, a hydro plant with the
same output requires an installed capacity of 1.7 MW at a cost of 1800 EUR/kW. Hence,
the alternative requires an investment of

mio EUR. We furthermore assume

initial unit costs of 0.0164 EUR/kWh for the coal plant and 0.0074 EUR/kWh for the hydro
plant. CO2 emissions are set to 820 g/kWh and 6 g/kWh, respectively. Irrespective of the
type of operated plant, we use an initial market price for power of 0.08 EUR/kWh in our
analysis. The discount rate is chosen to be

. Finally, we assume linear depreciation

and a corporate tax rate of 50%.

12

Note that we do not report detailed results for the case where the firm decides to reinvest in technology .
This decision is, if ever, only taken at
, after a decision at
not to invest in a new
technology plant. This case is of limited interest to our analysis since we focus on the question of whether
and when investment in takes place.

12
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Completing our basic parameter setting, we arbitrarily assume the revenues and the unit
costs to have drift and diffusion rates of 1%, respectively, with one exception. The unit cost
process of the coal plant is modeled as having a diffusion rate of

because of

more volatile coal prices included in the total cost. The price process of CO2 emission allowances is assumed to have a drift rate of

and a diffusion rate of

,

which on the one hand reflects consent price forecasts (e.g. a price of 30 EUR per ton CO2
in 2020) and on the other hand historical CO2 return volatility. The price processes start
with the following initial values:
Parameter Value
7446000 kWh · 0.0800 EUR/kWh = 595680 EUR
7446000 kWh · 0.0164 EUR/kWh = 122114 EUR
7446000 kWh · 0.0074 EUR/kWh = 55100 EUR
15 EUR/ton
0.82 ton/MWh · 7446 MWh · 15 EUR = 91586 EUR
0.006 ton/MWh · 7446 MWh · 15 EUR = 670 EUR
Table 1: Initial values for the simulation

We set our total model horizon

to be 40 years. Since we model our parameters to

roughly correspond to the situation in the EU in 2010, this corresponds to a horizon until
2050, which is the latest date for which useful emission quantity forecasts are available
(See European Commission (2011)). We then run 10000 simulations for all stochastic
components and derive an optimal point in time

for replacing technology

with

by

applying the algorithm as described in section 2.3.

3.1. An illustrative example
For the ease of understanding of our methodology, we present a brief numerical example
in this section. We simulate ten cash flow paths with a total of 40 cash flows each, with all
parameters taken from above. Figure 2 plots the ten cash flow time series for technology
and

plants:

13
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Figure 2: Example price paths. Deviating from the baseline parameter setting, these cash flow paths
use a diffusion rate of 10% for the CO2 price process, eliminating extreme price paths due to high
volatility and making the plot easier to read.

Due to our use of a fairly high CO2 allowance price drift rate of
coming from operating technology

, the cash flows

turn negative very quickly, whereas those from

are

less exposed to high carbon prices and thus exhibit a positive slope, resulting in positive
NPVs. Since no “dirty” cash flow path exhibits an NPV greater than the corresponding
“clean” one, all subsequent calculations for time

are restricted to the technology

cash flows. The individual “clean” NPVs and the expected NPVs from the regression approach, respectively, are:
2718

[

|

2639 3285 2266 2129 2444 2598 2508 2961 1907

] 2748 2882 2887 2479 2120 2411 2490 2612 2972 1854

Table 2: Expected net present values and net present values from an immediate investment in the
clean technology at
(thousand EUR).

The parameter estimates from the quadratic regression as outlined in section 2.3 yield
̂
̂
̂

̂

̂

̂

̂

. Due to the very low number of simulation paths, the signs of these esti-

14
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mates partly appear counterintuitive (in particular the estimate ̂

, derived from the data

in Table 3). However, with our standard number of 10000 state variable paths, the parameter of the linear revenue term exhibits a positive, and all linear cost related variables
negative signs. The signs of the quadratic term parameters are more difficult to interpret,
yet this is of limited importance since these terms are included only as controls.
Since all expected NPVs are positive, at

investment in

tion runs. So far our methodology thus suggests
every path. Working backwards in time, at

is undertaken in all simula-

as the optimal switching time in
we again first calculate the net present

values for all cash flow time series and subsequently estimate the “clean” NPVs based on
the level of the state variables at

. The results from applying the regression approach

can be seen in Table 3.
2751

[

|

2677 3288 2309

2136 2505 2665 2550

3004 1953

] 2887 2913 2934 2485 2207 2493 2586 2504 2960 1868

Table 3: Expected net present values and net present values from an immediate investment in the
clean technology at
(thousand EUR).

The

corresponding
̂

̂

estimated

regression

̂

̂

parameters

̂

are:

̂

̂

.

At this stage, standard discounted cash flow analysis would yield a recommendation for
immediate investment since all expected NPVs are positive. However, it may be a superior
strategy to delay the investment to the point in time which has so far been identified to be
optimal, namely

. The corresponding expected NPVs of the next period’s optimal

decision are therefore the expected NPVs presented in Table 4.
The decision between an immediate investment and a deferment now requires a reference
value, which can be obtained from equation (7). For each path, we then again use all
available state variables as independent variables and the expected NPV stemming from
the following period’s optimal behavior plus the cash flow from technology
period as the dependent variable. Note that contrary to the regression at
lier points in time we use both the

and

for the current
, at all ear-

cost values, since there is also the possibility of

a further deferment in the period after the next. This implies possible dependencies of next
period’s expected optimal NPV on the current cost level of the existing ( ) plant. The regression at

yields the following parameter estimates:

̂

̂
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̂

̂

̂
[

̂

̂

̂

(

̂

)

(

)

. They in turn resulting in the following expected optimal NPVs at
|

:

] 2808 2956 2927 2543 2131 2429 2545 2631 3023 1882

Table 4: Expected continuation values at

(thousand EUR).

The expected continuation values are greater than the expected payoffs from an immediate investment in paths

{

}, which makes it the optimal decision at

in the-

se paths to defer the investment in . Moreover these results cause the vector of updated
expected optimal NPVs at
[

counted values of
methodology at

to equal

[

] for these paths, and to equal the dis-

] for the remaining paths. Hence, for the next step of our

, this information is used to determine

Continuing like this until

[

].

yields a vector of optimal switching times

for all simulated

price paths. This allows us to draw a simulation-based inference regarding the optimal
time at which technology

should be realized.

3.2. Results without a CO2 emission price floor
We start the analysis proper by determining the optimal time
technology

with

for the replacement of

in the case where the price of CO2 emission allowances is not regu-

lated. Table 5 shows the results from 10000 simulations without a CO2 price floor.

#switches

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0

43

297

447

465

476

452

562

807

6451

Table 5: Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time
strategy results in technology being replaced by in all paths.

. The optimal

In the overwhelming majority of paths we find the optimal strategy to consist of investing in
a

plant at

. In the case of no CO2 price regulation, simulations thus essentially

16
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suggest the end of the investment decision horizon as the optimal time to switch from
technology

to .13

3.3. Results with a CO2 emission price floor
In this section we examine the effect on the distribution of optimal replacement times of
introducing a minimum price

for CO2 emission allowances, set by regulatory institu-

tions. As noted in section 2.2, the price floor is implemented by having the CO2 price follow
a GBM. However, if the market price trajectory falls below
calculations is instead set to
. Setting

, the price used for the cost

until the GBM appreciates again to a price higher than

equal to 30 EUR/ton yields the data depicted in Table 6. It displays, for
{

each point in time

}, the number of simulations yielding this time as the optimal

investment date.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

3

170

435

864

646

598

714

876

932

4762

Table 6: Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time
EUR/ton. Again Technology is replaced by in all paths.

when

#switches

Increasing

from 30 to 40 and 45 EUR/ton respectively, changes the distribution of the

optimal time of exercise as follows:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

40

#switches

516

1419 1053

805

655

503

518

520

795

3216

45

#switches

7074

754

193

160

76

131

128

183

945

356

Table 7: Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time
EUR/ton. Technology is replaced by in all paths.

when

We interpret these results as evidence of a very sensitive relation between
Apparently,

and

does not shift smoothly from the future to earlier points in time as

creases. Instead, there seems to be a critical level of

at which

.
in-

shifts quickly from

the latest to the earliest possible investment date. In our setup, we find the level of
which shifts the majority of paths’

from

to

to be around 42.50 EUR/ton.

13

Increasing the carbon price by means of a higher drift rate in formula (2) leads to earlier optimal switching
times. This result corroborates the findings of (Szolgayová, Fuss, and Obersteiner (2008)).
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Obviously, the methodology chosen is characterized by a pronounced binary pattern in

.

This is due to the regression approach used in the estimation of the present values of the
uncertain future cash flow time series. It removes the greatest part of the variation in the
price paths by basing decisions on expected values.
Figure 3 plots the distribution of optimal switching times
long as

. As

EUR/ton our simulations indicate the optimal switching time to be domi-

nated by
from

over different values of

. When
to

increases further, the optimal switching time quickly shifts

. Also, all other possible investment decision dates (

) are of minor importance. This graphically substantiates the proposition of a
binary pattern within the investment decision. The intersection of the
trajectories can be found around

and

. This floor price level can be interpreted as

the geometric solution to the question of the critical

which triggers

to shift from 10

to 1.

Figure 3: Distribution of optimal switching time

over different minimum prices for CO2

In reality it seems unlikely that any regulator will be able to directly implement a minimum
price of triple the current market price. For this reason we analyze the effects of a different

18
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price floor mechanism. In this second approach, we set the starting floor price
value close to the current market price and increase it by an increment
thereafter.14 If the initial minimum price
chosen to be

to a

in every period

is for example set to 15 and the increment is

, the next period’s minimum CO2 prices will be 16, then 17,and so on.

Contrary to a fixed level of

this approach does not result in a distribution of

optimal switching times peaking at

or

, but rather concentrates the optimal

switching decision to a time in the interior of [

] (especially when the diffusion rate

of the CO2 price process is low). The modal outcome of

depends on the choice of

Table 8 shows results from simulation runs where

.

and all other parameters are

set according to our basic scenario:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1

#switches

0

102

465

648

666

600

722

747

1088 4962

2

#switches

4

296

716

834

849

864

758

868

1159 3652

2.5

#switches

2

387

912

1160 1209

954

896

740

971

2769

3

#switches

2

533

1462 1779 1500

1239

955

610

443

1477

4

#switches

88

2116 3757 2887 1105

19

17

0

8

3

5

#switches

1042

5960 2893

6

#switches

7742

2252

7

#switches

9977

23

105

0

0

0

0

0

0

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Table 8: Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time
when
{
}. The higher the increment, the earlier the
EUR/ton and an increment of
replacement investment comes to be realized. Our results indicate the requirement of
EUR per
year for the mode of optimal switching times to occur earlier than at
.

Figure 4 presents the fraction of optimal switching times for different

when

is set to

3 EUR/ton. If a minimum price for CO2 is combined with a constant annual increase of this
minimum price, optimal switching times are – over large parts of the parameter space –
again dominated by two points in time, namely

and

. However, when

falls in the interval between 20 and 33 EUR/ton, other points in time can be observed to

14

Note that this is a generalization of our approach in that our previous analysis is a special case where
and
.
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exhibit peaks and thus constitute the predominant times at which the clean plant should be
built.

Figure 4: Fraction of optimal switching times

with respect to different

when

.

3.4. Discussion and Robustness Checks
As pointed out in the preceding section, the choice of input parameters is crucial for the
results regarding the optimal switching time

. Since some of our parameter settings re-

sult in very different optimal switching times for only slightly modified parameters we now
assess the robustness of our results by running simulations with a large set of parameter
setting variations. Our main interest lies in the effects of changes in


the initial minimum CO2 price



the chosen increment



the drift rate



the diffusion rate



the discount rate .

, and
of the CO2 price process, as well as
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More precisely, we jointly vary our parameters over the following values:
{

},

{

{

},

{

},

{

}

and

}, yielding a total of 21 · 6 · 6 · 5 · 5 = 18900 combinations of different

input parameter choices and requiring the simulation of 3x1010 individual values. All other
parameters are held constant, because they only concern revenues and technology related costs and lifetimes and are thus considered to be relatively reliable. The following figures plot results from the majority of the 18900 parameter settings. In the interest of clarity
we only report the decision time which maximizes the fraction of our 10000 paths in which
the switch to technology

occurs at this time (mode). This is done graphically in Figures 5

through 7. White areas indicate that

predominantly equals 10, whereas black areas la-

bel cases where the modal outcome is

. Other optimal points in time are shaded

gray. We do this separately for three different discount rates, namely

{

},

drift rates (rows of the plot matrix), and diffusion rates (columns of the plot matrix). This
yields 30 subplots per figure. In each subplot, the abscissa shows the different increments
{
{

} and the ordinate labels the different initial minimum CO2 prices,
}.

Figure 5: Most frequently chosen times for switching from technology
to when
. Black
indicates that the modal outcome from 10000 simulation runs is
and white indicates it to be
.
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Figure 6: Most frequently chosen times for switching from technology
to when
. Black
indicates that the modal outcome from 10000 simulation runs is
and white indicates it to be
.

In the case of

(Figure 5), low drift rates and high diffusion rates yield later optimal

switching times, while
nology

to

is more often found to be the optimal time to switch from tech-

if the drift rate is high and the diffusion rate of the CO2 price process is low.

As Figures 6 and 7 show,

shifts to later points in time with increases in the discount rate.

If we increase the latter to 0.07, almost all parameter settings result in a deferment of the
investment into technology

to the end of the investment decision horizon at

the exception of those cases where

and

(with

are relatively high).
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Figure 7: Most frequently chosen times for switching from technology
to when
. Black
indicates that the modal outcome from 10000 simulation runs is
and white indicates it to be
.

Taken together, we find a clear pattern in these plots. For each combination of the discount, the drift and the diffusion rates there exists a pair of
optimal time for replacing technology

with

from

and
to

which moves the

. This provides a clear

argument for CO2 price policy in the form of a price floor.
We also briefly assess the effects of different levels of input parameters employing a ceteris paribus analysis. The following figures depict the distribution of

for 10000 simulation

runs, varying one of the input parameters of interest and keeping all other parameters
constant. By default, we set

EUR/ton,

,

,

and

.

We vary the latter four separately to reveal the effects different levels of these parameters
have on the investment decision.
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Figure 8: The left hand plot depicts effects of different levels of the increment , the right hand plot
sketches the impact of different drift rates
of the CO2 price process.
is set to 30 EUR/ton.

Figure 9: The left hand plot shows the effect of different diffusion rates
on the optimal switching
time. On the right, effects of different discount rates on the investment timing problem are shown.
Again,
equals 30 EUR/ton.
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Note that, for the given parameter setting, the mode of the optimal switching time is
for any volatility of the CO2 price process. Furthermore, the fraction of cases where
is the optimal switching time is highest for very low and very high diffusion rates.
This is a departure from the findings for the other parameters, which exhibit a monotonously increasing or decreasing pattern for the fractions of optimal switching times
and

. Since this “volatility smile” could also have been the result of a too low num-

ber of simulation runs, we replicated this effect with 100000 simulations, obtaining the
same result. This pattern can be attributed to the fact that higher volatility of the CO 2 price
implies a greater number of very high carbon price scenarios as well as very low price
scenarios. A greater number of high CO2 price paths do not affect the investment decision,
since as soon as the CO2 price exceeds a critical threshold, an early investment into technology

is optimal in any case. However, since lower prices also become more frequent,

this benefits the dirty technology and results in the observed pattern of deferred switching
times. Furthermore the discount rate plays a prominent role, since there is great variability
in optimal switching times in a narrow bandwidth of discount rates. This shows that the
investment timing decision to a large degree depends on the capital costs of the firm.
Another aspect of our setup that we check for robustness are the uncorrelated processes
of state variables (revenues, unit costs using technologies

and , CO2 costs). We tackle

this point by introducing a (largely) non-zero correlation matrix of the form:

[

]

We assume that revenues are positively linked to costs, since any power producer will try
to pass increased costs on to consumers. Nonetheless, the correlations are chosen with
the main aim of capturing what possible effect the use of correlated state variables could
have, without trying to exactly mirror real world correlation structures. We chart the effects
we find as the difference in the fractions of optimal switching times between a simulation
using uncorrelated state variables and one employing correlated state variables.
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Figure 10: Differences in the fraction of optimal switching times. The plot shows changes from the
uncorrelated setup when introducing correlation between the state variable processes.

Figure 10 shows that the optimal switching times from

to

are hardly affected

by introducing correlation. At the same time, applying the correlation matrix
smaller (greater) fraction of cases where

(

) when

results in a

is low (high). The fol-

lowing table reports the exact number of simulations with correlated state variables leading
{

to

}, and can be readily compared to tables 5 and 7 for the same results using

uncorrelated state variable processes:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

59

302

423

557

508

641

659

1062 5789

0

#switches

0

40

#switches

825

1089 1111

737

658

504

473

555

881

3167

45

#switches

8233

431

85

89

55

89

90

132

603

193

Table 9: Number of simulation runs (out of 10000) with optimal replacement at time
when
EUR/ton and the revenue, unit cost and CO2 price processes are correlated according to

.
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4. Conclusion
In this paper we evaluate the effects of downward limited stochastic CO 2-prices on the investment decision of a profit maximizing energy producer. We apply an approach derived
from real-option valuation and demonstrate that a CO2 price floor can be used to induce
emitters to accelerate their investments in low-carbon technologies. Since the decarbonization of the power sector, which accounts for a substantial proportion of total greenhouse
gas emissions, is a conditio sine qua non for achieving lower emission targets, we choose
this industry for our analysis. The key argument lies in the fact that the decision to invest in
low-carbon generation technologies immediately may be superior to continuing to operate
a high-carbon technology, especially in high permit price regimes. This decision is taken
by comparing the expected net present value of an immediate clean investment to that
resulting from the deferment of an investment. Our results based on Monte Carlo simulations identify the appropriate level of a constant minimum CO2-price in our setting – implying an immediate “clean” investment – to fluctuate between 40 and 45 Euros per ton. An
alternative solution is to introduce a fixed initial minimum price with a growth rate regime,
as it is currently being implemented in the UK (HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs
(2010)). Simulations reveal that under this approach, the starting CO2 price floor can be
considerably lower, with its optimal level – unsurprisingly – depending on the growth rate.
However, our results turn out to be relatively sensitive with respect to the model inputs. We
perform extensive robustness checks and find patterns in the distribution of optimal switching times which enable us to derive robust findings. In particular, some parameter settings
balance the optimal investment timing somewhere in the interior of the investment decision
horizon. We use this observation to clearly identify the impacts of changes in the CO2 price
floor, its growth rate, the drift and diffusion of the CO2 price process and the discount rate.
Moreover, we demonstrate that the carbon market not only helps the regulator to meet
emission targets in an allocationally efficient way, but can also be used as an instrument to
stimulate the adoption of low-carbon technologies. Several political proposals (e.g. in Australia, the UK and US) in the recent past support this view of the carbon market. Meanwhile it has become apparent that a permit trading system will not suffice as the sole driver
in reaching the target of a decarbonized economy. A mixture of policy instruments will instead be necessary to stabilize our climate. A carbon price floor is one such instrument,
which is able to enhance the role of an emissions trading system in this process.
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